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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 30 NO. 2&3 2004 warning them that any research their faculty produces that is later used for regulation must meet the government's multifaceted "sound science"" requirements.^ Even federal courts have become involved by presiding over a complaint that the government's climate change models are not reliable and should be withdrawn troni public dissemination.'' At the same time that "sound science" reforms are proliferating, there is a surge in aeademic concern about the objectivity and quality of private or "sponsored" science used for public policy. Regulated parties who sponsor research that informs regulation of their products or activities have incentives to influence the research in ways that ensure favorable outcomes. Yet since research design and reporting is inherently layered with discretionary judgments that are diOlcuIt to discern without replicating the research directly, systemic biases in these judgments are difficult to detect from the outside. As long as sponsors control the research at some or all poinis in the research process, adverse results can be suppressed and the design and reporting of experiments can be biased in ways that produce results that support the sponsor's interests, rather than otTer a disinterested examination of potential harms.
Despite their rather obvious points of convergence, these two sets of eoncerns have remained separate over the past decade. Worrisome evidence of compromised private research is effectively ignored as the "sound science" reforms take aim primarily at publicly Hmded research.^ As a result, oversight of the quality of regulatory science is growing increasingly biniodal: public research is subject to increased scrutiny, while private research remains largely insulated from outside review and meaningflil agency oversight.
In this Article, we argue that to the extent there is a problem with regulatory science in health and safety regulation, the "sound science" reforms miss the target by taking aim at public, rather than private science. We develop this argument in three parts. Kirst, in Part II of the Article, we identify the critical role that private information plays in regulation, and how under-reporting of harms eouid lead to far greater harms and risks than society is willing to tolerate. We then present evidence supporting a conclusion that private research is otten compromised, especially as compared to federally funded research, in ways that underreport adverse etlects and lead to a misleadingly rosy picture of the safety of a sponsor's products or wastes. Next, in Part III, we identify how the laws, and especially the "sound science" reforms, get the problem precisely backward by focusing oversight checks on federally flinded researeh and exempting, or at least providing far less internal and external oversight of, research sponsored by aflc'cted parties. Finally, in Part IV, we describe ways to equalize the review of publicly and privately sponsored research. In the absence of this equal treatment, regulated parties will continue to have few incentives to produce private research of high quality, while at the same time they will critique public research when the findings are adverse to their interests.
EQUAL TREATMENT EOR REGULATORY SCIENCE 121 II. THE IMPORTANCE OF HIGH QUALITY PRIVATE SCIENCE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH PROTECTION
Public health regulators make life and death decisions when they promulgate standards to protect the public health. If the research they rely upon to make these decisions is compromised, then there may be more losses, perhaps substantially more, than the regulators or the public onlookers are willing to tolerate. An accumulating body of evidence suggests that some of the private science that forms the primary, and sometimes the exclusive, input for regulatory decisions regarding publie health and safety laeks important seientifie safeguards that eould result in research that underreports harms to health and the environment. In this Part, we first discuss the important role that private seienee plays in regulation. We then turn to the ways in which the harms in this sponsored seienee might be underreported by sponsors who reserve control over the research.
A. CRITICAL ROLI-:OK PRIVATL:SciiiNcr:TORF-CHII.AIION Privately sponsored science often provides the exclusive information for making decisions about the safety of pesticides and chemicals. Under both the Federal Insecticide, Kungicide, and Rodentieide Aet ("EIFRA"f and the Toxie Substances Control Aet ("TSCA"),' manufaeturers of new products are required to provide the agency with all available information on the safety of the products as a condition to marketing, and in some eases are required to conduct new research on product safety.'" Manufacturers who market existing pesticides and chemicals are also oeeasionally required to conduct research to help regulators assess the produet's safety." Many of these mandatory tests are specified under relatively rigid protocols thai leave little r(K)m for discretionary reporting.'' But as tests become more substance-specific and less eapable of being eondueted in a controlled laboratory setting-for example, studying reproductive and developmental ettects in organisms exposed to a substanee in the environment-the amount of researcher discretion in the design and reporting of findings inevitably inereases.
The laws that regulate the release of pollutants depend less fundamentally on private research in setting regulatory standards, but nevertheless make use of any science that is available, including privately sponsored science. As a result, risk assessments used to set contaminant levels in drinking water and exposure standards for worker protection are often based in part on private seienee.'^ This voluntarilŷ F-cdcral InsccticiiJc. Fungicide, and Rodcnlicide Act ("FlhRA"). 7 U.S.C. ij!; 136 el seq. (2000) .
•^ Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. i^ij 2601-2629 (20(10) . 'f Sec; (.•.)-.. I-IFRA, 7 D.S.C. § 136d(a)(2) ("11" at any time afler the rereyistration of a pesticide the registrant has additional factual informalion regarding unreasonable adverse elTects on the environment of the pesticide, the regislr;int shall submit such inform;ition u» Ihc Adminstralor."); TSCA. 15 U.S.C. §S 2607 (c). (e) (same); hi. t; 26{l4|b) (requiring premarket toxicity testing as a condition lo registration of new pesticides).
11 See. e.!^., FIFRA, 7 U.S.C.!; 136a-l; TSCA. 15 U.S.C. tj 2603(a). '-Under FIFRA, the Knvironmcnlal Protctjtion Agency ("HPA") has developed a chart setting out the series of tests that a manufacturer musl conduct before a pesticide is permitted to enter the market. See 40 C.F. R. pt. 158 (2003) (setting forth a "basic eore set" of more than 100 studies that would assist in determining the effects of pesticides); Id i; I5S.34O (providing a table tor all testing requirement.s and guidelines under illRA). Not all of these tests specily rigid testing protocols, however. See, e.g., 40 C.I .R. §S 158.290, 158.490, 158 .590 (testing to determine respectivciv the environmental fate of pesticides, impacts on wildlife, and effects on nontargel insects). '^ The extent of private science underlying our scientific understanding of toxic substances has not been s\stemalically studied or dneiimenled. Aneedola! aeeounts, however, reveal that a 122 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 30 NO. 2&3 2004 produced research, in eontrast to mandated research produced under the pestieide and chemical regulation statutes, is typically done without the benefit of rigid protocols and thus its quality is even more difTicult to evaluate.
B. WHY THE QuAt.n Y OF PRIVATELY SPONSORED SCIENCE CAN BE COMPROMISED
At the same time that privately sponsored researeh provides a critical input to regulation, there is growing evidence that it can be compromised in ways that might underreport or even suppress evidence of harm. Sponsors face strong ineentives to design and report research in ways most favorable to their interests and to suppress adverse results provided they can do so without detection. In the past, more than a few products or pollutants have been left effectively unregulated because the manufacturer or polluter concealed evidence of the true harm or obseured adverse results.
Privately sponsored science, if done without guarantees of research independence, thus violates one of the most llindamental norms of seienee; namely, that researeh be disinterested.'""
Evidenee of underreporting of harms in private researeh is most common in the biomedical arena, although there is growing evidenee in the environmental and publie heahh arenas as well." Unfortunately, many of these unscientific practices are missed by regulators. "* In a world with infinite resources, any biases that infeet research would ultimately be caught through third-party, disinterested replication of the researeh. Given the scarce resources and considerable seientifie gaps in environmental regulation, however, resources are rarely if ever available to replicate the scant researeh that does exist. In addition, the trade secret classification of the ehemieal eomposition of many of these products, eoupled with the lack of public funding, means that the amount of public replication of private research results is limited. As a result, sponsors often enjoy an effective monopoly on the scientific information base regarding their produets. The ways that privately sponsored science can be and has been compromised are discussed below.
I. Falsification of Data and Research Findings
Falsification of research is the most serious, but fortunately the least common, problem with privately sponsored researeh used for regulation. Palsifieation is dilTieult for regulators to deteet, short of replicating the research, but because the penalties for cotnmitting fraud are often devastating, sponsors generally avoid this significant portion of research used to regulate produets is industry-sponsored. See., e.g means of manipulating research. Criminal and civil sanctions, impaired firm reputation, and distrust by regulators all can result from a single falsifted study.'M oreover and in any case, there may be ways short of fraud to control the outcome of research as discussed helow.
Yet even though falsification of research in regulation is uncommon, it is not unprecedented.
The most notorious examples of fraudulent research in environmental regulation occurred with a contractor who falsified a number of results in conducing required safety testing for pesticide manufacturers in the 1970s.'^ These data fabrications saved the consulting organization time and resources, but were not evidently intended to produce preordained results for specific pesticides.'"* Falsification of measurements collected as part of mandatory self-monitoring requirements has also been documented. For example, the Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969"" requires coal operators to collect bi-monthly air samples of the underground work environment to identify excess levels of coal mine dust iti order to reduce the risk of eoal workers pneumoconiosis among the miners."^' The mine operator sends the dust exposure samples he collects to a U.S. Department of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA") laboratory for analysis, and if the results exceed a permissible level, the mine operator receives a citation and monetary penalty.""^ When these provisions were originally proposed, eoal miners scoffed at the idea, likening it to self-enforcement for trafVic violations; imagine a system when the driver is asked to voluntarily send the state police a notice that they have driven over the speed limit so they ean be sent a traffic ticket. Widespread abuses of the self-reporting system were uncovered in the 1990s, when the MSHA laboratory discovered that mine operators had tampered with hundreds of dust samples. Suspicious samples were identified as eoming from approximately one-third of the mines eovered by the law; more than 200 mine operators (including at least one of the nation's largest) and their eontractors were eventually convicted on criminal charges."
Ends-Oriented Biases in Design and Reporting of Research
Sponsors can also design or report regulation-relevant research in ways that are favorable to their interests, btit fail short of being clearly fraudulent or dishonest.'"' 17 Set-. f.«., False Statements Accountability Act of 1996. 18 ll.S.C. S 1001 (2000Hproviding for fines or iniprisanmcnt for falsification or concealment of material facts from the federal government).
" Respiriihti; Coal Mine Dust. 1969 ,93 AM. J. PUEJ. HhAt.ll! 1236 .
24 Professor Krimsky endeavors to isolate this type of ends-oriented bias, which appears to afiect the outcome of the research in statistically significant ways. See generally KRIMSKY, supra note 13, at 141-44; see also Sidney A. Shapiro, Divorcing I'rofit Motivulion Jrom Ai'H' Drug Research: A Consideration of Proposals to Provide FDA With Reliahle Test Data. 1978 DliKI' L.J. 155. 163 In the design of the research, there are often choices to be made by the researcher about test subjects, laboratory conditions, lengths of time of the study, and what types of observations to report, even for rigidly specified protocols."^ In a selfdesigned study of the etTects of pesticides on birds, for example, the researcher might make decisions about which effects to notice and record in the data log, and then later, which effects to statistically analyze. If each of these incremental discretionary decisions is made in a way most favorable to the sponsor, the results can ultimately tend toward one side of the results spectrum.'^''
Similarly, decisions about how to report effects in a study can be affected by a researchers' predisposition towards the outeonie. Some adverse effects can be downplayed or explained away in the written findings, while the positive outcomes of the study can be overemphasized. In one study of 192 random clinical trials conducted on prospective drugs, for example, the researchers found that the written reports of the research did not adequately describe the adverse effects of the drugs under study or explain why a patient stopped taking the drug."Ê vidence that parties with direct conflicts of interest can somtemes design and report results in ways that are favorable to their interests, rather than in ways that best represent the research, has been extensively documented."** The "funding effect," where the results of privately sponsored research are statistically compared against the results of publicly Ilinded research on similar regu I at ion-re levant questions, shows consistent and rather dramatic sponsor-bias in the fmal results."*F or example, one study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association reports: "By combining data from articles examining 1140 studies, we found that industry-spon.sored studies were signillcantly more likely to reach conclusions that were favorable to the sponsor than were non-industry studies."^" In research of the tobacco industry, there is even statistical evidence that this sponsored research is of lower quality, a conclusion based on findings of independent reviewers who were blinded to identifying characteristics of the affiliations of the authors." Although the funding effect shows only a correlation and does not prove (discussing Ihis problem in research by drug companies on the safety of drugs); Shankar Vedantam. Anlidepressiinl Makers a'ilhhoUl Data on Children. WASH. Pos I, .Ian. 29, 2004, at AI. -' In condiicling laboratory Icsts on the toxicity ot'a substance, for example, researchers might fociis exclusively on rccortting ihe tumors (if the experiment is designed to tesl for cancer) and will nol even record or take written nolice of other types of surprise adverse reactions thai oceur in the course of the study.
-^ See KRIMSKY. supra note 13, at 142-44 (describing the discretionary decisions that arise in conducting studies on ihe safety and cirieacy of drugs); iJ. at 155-58 (describing evidence of sponsors "tweaking ihe protocols" when under legal pressure),
- III 33-50 (1996) (diseussing evidence of fraud and bias in industry-conducted or sponsored studies on the safetj of substances).
or explain bias in the design or reporting of findings of sponsored research, biases (or strong financial conllitts) remain one of the leading explanations for the eflect.^' Other evidence of undue sponspor influence in regulation-relevant research is more anecdotal, but nevertheless worrisome. In a number of individual research projects, some sponsors have exerted dramatic control over the oulcome of the research, to the point of designing the study, framing the research question, and even editing and ghost-writing the article by hiring scientists willing to "collaborate" closely with the sponsoring industry under contracts that require sponsor control of the research. ' Additionally, several prominent scientific Journal editors lament the ways regulated parties have abused publication practices to provide a misleadingly positive picture of the body of research that has bearing on their products. Some sponsors, for example, have been caught publishing the same study in difTerent journals under dilTerent author names with no cross-references, making it appear that the research support in favor of their product or activity is based on several independent studies, rather than simply a re-reporting of the same findings.'^ Since commissioned studies are viewed in the scientific community as being less credible than studies without atTected sponsors, disclaimers are increasingly required as a condition to publication/*^ To circumvent this requirement, some sponsors have developed ways lo "launder" their research support through nonprofit shells to create the illusion that they play no role in research that supports their interest.^"^ Parties As a result, some prominenl research journals refuse to publish litcralurc reviews or editorials where the author has a eonilict of interest in the outcome, since the extent and elVect of the bias is difllcult to detect through the usual methods of replication and validation familiar to science. See. 2&3 2004 trying to influence regulation have also commissioned review articles and convened expert panels that purport to summarize existing research on a topic-such as the health effects of environmental tobacco smoke-even though in reality the commissioned review articles or reports are intended (and contractually guaranteed) to portray existing research in the light most favorable to the sponsor."
Suppression of Adverse Results
Einally and perhaps most serious is the ability of sponsors to suppress research when the results arc adverse to their interests. Unlike fi-aud. suppressing adverse results can sometimes be done with discretionary judgments that are not illegal. Eor example, sponsors can abort research before it is completed, and base this decision on limited resources or some purported design flaw in the study. Eor research that is completed, sponsors can still justify withholding the results based on discretionary judgments that the research design or reporting was incomplete or flawed in some way or that follow-up research is needed to confirm or validate the findings.^'' All of these judgments are difTtcult to question from the outside and can often be justified, however weakly, even if the suppression is discovered.
In practice, suppression of research has been a recurring problem with privately sponsored research. Sponsors sometimes contractually reserve the right to suppress publication of the research they fund and are not reticent to use this right if the study results are adverse to their interests.^" Some corporate actors have selectively limited access to potentially damaging information abtiut their products and activities in ways that substantially harmed public health.^' Eor example, Johnson &^ The skillful use of review articles has been identified as one strategy used by at least the tobacco industry. Deborah E. Barnes & Eisa A. Bero, li'hy Review Articles on the Health Effects of Passive Smoking Reach Different Conclusions, 279 JAMA 1566 (1998 (finding that the most strongly supported explanation for the discrepancy in reviews assessing the impact of passive smoking was whether or not they were written by authors afllliated with the tobacco industry). The creation of hand-picked or "stacked" expert panels is even more commonplace. See, e.g.. Si ANTON Gl ANTZ ET AL., ruh Cic.ARI TTI-PAPLRS 32-33 (1996) (summarizing that fobacco Industry Research Committee ("TIRC," later named Council for Tobacco Research ("CfR")) was formed jointly by tobacco companies with the publicly identified purpose of "!und|ing] independent scientific research" on hazards of cigarettes, while internal documents reflect ils true purpose was "for public relations ... to convince the public that the hazards of smoking had no! been definitively proven"): RICHARD Kl iKil R, Asiil.s lo AsHKs: AMLRICA'S HtiNDRin-Yi AR CKIARI-rit: WAR. Tni-: \'\m\ if HI:AI.TH, AND Thii UNAUASIII-D TRHIMPH OF PFIIUP MORRIS 164-67, 205-12. 227-29, 466-68 (1996) Researehers and Patients. 289 JAMA 2128 . 2128 -29 (2003 (diseussing tlie efforts of Apotex Inc. to conceal research, including the halting of two trials under a confidentiality clause and issuing legal warnings under the guise of confidentiality to prevent the prinieipal investigator from publishing the study results or disclosing risks to patienls).
• 
**
Merreil Dew's culpability in the conlroversial breast implanl litigation was in large part due to its stubborn refusal to research the adverse etTects of silicone in ihe body cavity (even at the insistence of the Food and Drug Administration), in light of their own preliminary and secret in-house evidence suggesting that the implants were leaking and harmful. See, e.g.. Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116 , 1127 -28 (9th Cir. 1994 ) (affirming punitive damage award based in part on evidence that company concealed adverse results of clinical studies and knew that long-term studies were needed). In Hopkins, the court stated; Dow obtained results of a study in which tour dogs received silicone gel implants that resembled the implants that Dow was then marketing. Ihc results demonstrated that after six months, the implants appeared to be functioning properly, but that atier two years, intlaniniation surrounding the implants demonstrated the existence of an immune reaction. Dow did not publicly release the results of this research for several years, and when il did ultimately release the results, Dow omitted the negative findings and implied that the impianis were safe. Id. at 1119; see al.so Rebecca Wcisman, Reforms in Medieal Device Regulation: An Examination of the Sdicone Gel Breast Implant Dehacle. 23 Ci(H,ni:N GATh U. L. Rl.V. 973, 987 n.l22 (1993) (quoting Dow Corning discovery documents and summary of scientitlc studies). Dow Corning also conducted a study in 1974 Ihat revealed that silicone could "trigger strong reactions of the immune system," but Dow Corning denied such a reaction at an FDA hearing in 1991. Id. at 988 n.l23. Finally, in 1987 Dow Corning was aware that some of its employees had falsified documents regarding silieone breast implants, but Dow Corning did not alert the FDA t<j these misstatemenls until 1992.5f(.'JW.
4^
The record of asbestos manufacturers' attempt to conceal or downplay the hazards of asbestos is well documented. See generally PAtn. BRODl.tiR. OtilRAtil-ODS MiscONDdCl: Till-: ASBl-.STOS iNntlslRY ON TRIAL (1985) (chronicling asbestos litigation throughout the industry). Some of the more dramatic examples include animal studies on asbcstosis in the I93()s, the findings of which, by agreement, belonged to the investors until they agreed to disclose them to the public, notes detailing Johns-ManviUe Co.'s health review committee meeting during which executives "developed a corporate policy of not informing sick employees of the precise nature of their health problems for fear of workmen's-eompensation claims and lawsuits." and successful company efforts to persuade adverse health impacts. The manufacturer of an antidcpressant, Paxil, was recently sued by New York State for concclaing unfavorable result.s from cliniea! trials done on children, leading to demands from the seientifie and medical community that pharmaceulieal companies be required to publicly disclose the results of all clinical trials, regardless of whether reportina of the results of the research is legally mandated.
In the oeeupational health arena, a textile manufacturing companywielding a confidentiality agreement-pressured occupational medieine researchers to suppress data showing adverse elTects on workers in the nylon tloeking industry/*' A large number of companies have also resisted mandatory reporting requirements on the adverse effects of their products/"
III. UNEQUAL SCRUTINY OF THE QUALITY OF PRIVATE RELATIVE TO PUBLIC RESEARCH
As the previous section details, the quality of privately sponsored research is often compromised by bias, yet environmental regulatory decisions nevertheless must depend upon it in setting protective standards. As a result, public health and environmental regulatory decisions based on private science could systematically underestimate the risks of a product or waste stream.
By contrast, publiely funded research, by virtue of its greater assurance of research independence, would seem to be mueh less inclined to be eneumbered with systematic biases that alTcct researeh fmdings.^'
The diverse motives and baekgrounds of the researchers doing puhlic health researeh, which generally include scientists from consultant laboratories, HPA, and academia, further dissipate the the editor of" a trade magazine that growing scientific studies on "asbestos . . . '*'' The tobacco industry vigorou.slv concealed both its research on the carcinogenic and on the addictive properties of cigarettes, .^ec. e.f;., Gl ANI7 I:T AI,., supra note 37, at 15 (concluding that by the early 1960s Brown & Williamson Tobacco Company and its parent. British American lobacco. "had developed a sophisticated understanding of nicotine pharmacology" but did not disclose this understanding to con.sumers); I'lL at 58-107 (outlining documentary evidence of industry's knowledge of and research on addictive properties of nicotine); Pllll ir J. Hll rs, SMOklscRlil.N: Till, TRUTH BfcliiND ini fonACto iNULiSIRY Covi-R-Up 38-40 U996) (describing cover-up of rich research conduclcd internally on carcinogenic properties of cigarettes and Brown & Williamson's "document retention" policy that involved shipping all of this research and underlying documentation out of country). 327-28 (1998) . A university-based researcher found a new form of interstitial lung disease, ""(loek worker's lung," and its eapacity to aftect as many as 2,500 persons employed by the nylon Hocking industry in the United Stales. The company and the researcher's university attempted to suppress the findings; with the university responding hy eliminating the oeeupalional tuedicine unit and deciding not to renew the lead researcher's cmpkivmcnt eontiacl. See f-enerally Wade Koush et al., Piihlishin^ Sensitive Data: Who Calls the Sho/.s., 276 Scil NCI. 523 (1997) (eonMdentiality agreement between researcher and textile eompany used to suppress data shouing adverse effects on workers).
-** See infra Section III.A. ' See. e.j?., KRIMSKY. supra note 13, at 144 (describing the differcnees thai could lead to hias in industry-sponsored research relative lo publicly funded research).
likelihood that there will be systematic biases that lean dramatically one way or another. This is borne out in empirical studies of researeh.^^ In fact, the "sound science" proponents tail to provide evidence of significant problems with publicly llinded science used in public health regulation.Ŷ et despite the higher probability of bias in private research relative to publie research, most "'sound scienee" laws and regulations focus peer review, external complaint processes, and other quality controls almost exclusively on publie researeh or syntheses of research fmdings. "* At the same time, they exempt a good portion of private research from their requirements. Private research is also exempted from public scrutiny through guarantees aftbrded "proprietary information" and "confidential business information" ("CBI").^^ The laws and regulations, in other words, do precisely the opposite from what the underlying quality of the research would demand. They tend to insulate private research from scrutiny and focus attention on public research.
The ways that the quality of private research is under-regulated in relation to public researeh are detailed in this seetion.
A. PRIVATK RKSHARCH IS OFTPN Ct.ASSIFIHD ANIJ IS NO1 PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
A great deal of private science is classified and reviewed hy only a few, eleared government officials, despite the fact that open communication of research is a tenet of good science.^'' Most classification of private research is based on the protection of industry "trade seerets" and is intended primarily to protect proprietary formulas and manufacturing processes from use by competitors.^' Current regulatory programs provide regulated parties with the option of elassifying any information that they believe eould be used by a competitor to their eeonomic detriment.^'' As a result, inanufaeturers and polluters have been given wide latitude under at least FIFRA and TSCA to classify health and safety researeh that they believe can cause 52 See (4)). 139 A.L.R. FliD. 225 (1997) . 56 See Public Infornialion and Confidentiality Regulations. 59 Fed. Reg. 60,446, 60,446-60,447 (Nov. 23, 1994 ) ("The |Fnvironmental Prolection] Agency collects ehemleal, proeess, waste stream, ilnancial, and other data from tens of thousands of facilities in man> seetors of Ameriean business. Companies Irequenlly consider this information vital to iheir competitive position, and claim it as confidential business information (CBl)'").
5^
See fienerally economic harm as confidential business information, often without specifying the nature ot the trade secret concerns. Once the CBI claim is asserted by a regulated party, the claim of "trade secret" is generally considered valid^'' by the EPA until a party requests the information under the Ereedom of Information Act ("EOIA").''*' Health and safety studies (as well as most routine claims on the corresponding chemical identity of a toxic substance) are among the information classified by industry as CBI,**' even though the laws expressly disfavor this classification.'''Û nder most existing regulations, moreover, the CBI claims require no substantiation^a manufacturer has only to stamp the documents "confidential" for the privilege to apply.**' No otfieial from the company need take responsibility for asserting the claim;''^ there are no penalties for asserting the claim when it is facially frivolous;**'^ and the firm is presumed to waive the privilege if they do not stamp this information as confidential when first submitting it to the agency.'''' Based on this regulatory structure, firms openly concede that it is more cost-effective for them to Reg. 80,394, 80,395 (Dec. 21, 2000) (observing that "'CBI regulations generally do not require a business lo submit a substantiation until disclosure becomes an issue"). Generally, it appears that a Freedom of Information Aet ("FOIA") request serves as the impetus for the KPA to review a CBI claim. Set-, e.^ , id. ("\,V\ often finds it necessary to make llnal confidentiality detcrminalion.s as a result of FOIA requests or rulemaking."). In 1994. KPA reported that it received more than 40,000 FOIA requests a year. man\ of which sought confidential business information. See [; PA, Public Information and Conndcntiality Regulations. 59 Fed. Reg. 60.446. 60,447 (Nov. 23. 1994) . Nonetheless, KPA aggressively challenged more than 700 CBI claims under TSCA in 1990 on its own (without a FOIA trigger) and appeared to make substantial headway in reducing the number of over-inclusive claims. See Julie Yang. Note. '. 10203. 10204 (2000) (discussing this point and concluding that "[tlhis threat of income loss provides the economic incentive that molivales industry to oppose agencies" broader dissemination of induslry-submilted technological and process data").
Confulcnlial
routinely stamp as much internal information as CBI when no substantiation is required.''Â t the same time that the claim is effectively costless for industry, it can be quite costly for those trying to obtain access to the information.'''* To access information stamped CBI, an interested party, including a health professional, researcher, or the physician of a person exposed to the substance, must know the information exists (or probably exists);'''' send a FOIA request; follow up with a second FOIA request if pieces of information appear left out or unaccounted for; and be prepared to litigate if the information is not produced. The search costs are even high for the agency, since streamlined comprehensive databases and filing systems may not be possible for CBI-stamped data, and only "cleared" regulators (until recently a category that excluded all state officials)^" can access the information.^' <' For example, llrms have argued in opposing CUl reforms thai the internal analysis required lor some form af uplront substantiation of trade secret elaims (i.e., determining what internal infortnatiiin is legitimately trade secret protected and what is not) is so time-consuming thai it might violate the Regulatory Klexibility Act due to the added burden the requirement would impose on small manufacturers. It is far less costly, ihey argue, lo err on the side of over-claiming. .9ft ', e.fr As a result, a Cfll claim raises the "search costs" for others to access ihe information, in some cases so substantially that interested parties will invest neither the money nor the lime in obtaining the information or in learning how they might obtain it.
''^ For these and other scientific costs that How from CBI claims, see Lyndon, supra note 67, at 34-39.
™ The statute was read lo foreclose allowing slate ofllcials to access information claimed as CBI. TSCA, 15 U.S.C. tj 2613(at (2000) . tPA has worked to provide states access through the "contractors" provision ol'TSCA. Id. § 26l3(a)(2); see Yang, xupra note 60, at 232. This limited scientific review is suboptimal for ensuring the quality of the underlying data and research. One study of CBI concedes that "Iwjhile there is no reason to doubt the competence of [1-!PA Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics C'OPPT")] scientists, limited data access results in limited review."^^ "As an example, the structure-activity prediction methods used by OPPT scientists depend to a significant extent upon CBi data; they therefore can not be fully evaluated by outside scientists."'"Î ndeed, the increased barriers to agency stalf and nonprofit groups in accessing CBI information provide still more potential benefits to firms that aggressively classify their information as trade secret protected,^^ A 1992 Hampshire Study^'' reported that federal and state agencies encountered significant barriers accessing CBI information, while labor and environmental groups said they had "given up" on seeking CBI information submitted under TSCA." For example, in the review of biotechnology products, environmental groups reported that it took three years to acquire the CBI stamped information under FOIA; by that time, the industry's request for a license had been approved and "in many cases the environmental release of genetically engineered organisms had occurred."^** The Hampshire study also noted the lack of public participation on EPA's efforts to ban asbestos, a tact that it attributed in part to the fact that a significant portion of the information on the safety of asbestos, and the agency's analysis of thai information, has been classified by the regulated industry as CBI.
Despite the potentially significant social costs in terms of reduced scientific and public oversight of private research, the EPA has few incentives to conduct more aggressive review of CBI claims. The high direct cost of reviewing all stamped -See, e.g.. foxi(_-SUBsiANfls CoNlKui. AC I, supra note 68, at 5:1; .see also HAMF' SllTRr STtJDY, supra note 61, at 26-27 (observing the extraordinarily limited access to CBI; "[elven typewriter ribbons must be secured until they arc destroyed").
-' /</. al 35.^
Ihis possibility is lurther reintbreed by the grounds that industry sometimes gave lor claiming as CBI health and safety studies reported under section 8(c) of fSCA. "^ The Hampshire Study researchers observe:
In the nearly llfleen years that this regulatory efiort has been under uay, public participation has been minimal, rellecting the fact that FPA has been unable to publicly release the analytical documents that support its regulatory decisions, particularly with regard lo asbestos economics and potential substitute materials. Ihis situation clearly illustrates the 'infectious' nature of CBI, in that even governmenlconducted analyses that rely on CBI materials thejiiselves become CBI. It further demonstrates the potential for CBI elaims to have lundamental impacts on the regulatory process, precluding effective public oversight.
Id. at 32.
information provides the first major impediment. " As a result of these eosts, agency officials concede that they typically do not review the merits of industry CBI claims, at least lor new chemical classifications.**' Instead these claims are automatically retained,**' Second, from the ageney ofTieial's perspective, there are more costs than benefits to disputing CBI claims. Agency officials who wrongfully divulge trade secret information can be charged criminally, imprisoned for up to one year, and must be terminated from their position.**^ The agency also could be subjected to a "reverse FOIA" suit,"^ and potentially even a suit claiming compensation for the wrongfi.ll misappropriation.**' By contrast, the only penalty for making an erroneous judgment nol to disclose CBI is the possibility of a suit by the person seeking the information under FOIA,*"' Since FOIA requestors do not have access to the nondisclosed information or even the firm's justification for asserting the claim in some cases,*''' the claimants are naturally handicapped in challenging the determination that the information has competitive value. ** At worst, the agency will only be forced to disclose the information.'*' Studies show that firms take full advantage of this generous approach to trade secret proteetion and assert the claitn even when doing so is clearly without 80 See id. at 17. 81
Id. '!94, 80,396 (Dec. 21. 2000) (conceding potenlial problems wiih IJ'A's policy of automatically classifying suhstantiations as CBI if the firm requests ihem, which in lurn deprives FOIA requestors of not oiil> the information, but the basis for the CBI claim that prohibits its disclosure). 8** Sec Lyndon, supra note 67, at 35. 8'' It has been suggested by a FOIA expert that the ageney will avoid this information as much a.s possible because il wants to avoid both types of lawsuits. See, e.g., O'Reilly, supra note 66, al 10208 ("A possible trend in administrative agency data eollection may be the conscious decision to avoid collecting CBI where the access to such iuforinalion ties up the agency in disputes over the post-collection diseiosure of the CBI.").
' ' ** KPA openly concedes that the problem of overbroad CBI elaims is serious: liPA receives a large number of submissions of various types of information claimed as CBI. Many of the claims received are very broad, and ihe Agency has limited resources to deal with this stream of information. A.s a result, large amounts of information claimed as CBI arc retained by ihe Agency longer than necessary, and broad or non-specific CBI claims may limit public access to information that is nol actually CBI.
Public Information and Ciml'idcntiatity: Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Withdrawal ol ' 1994 Proposed Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 8o',394. 80.395 (Dec. 21, 2000 ; see, e.g., llAMl^SHlKI SlUDY, supra note 61, at 7, 19, 21, 24, 41 (discussing the sharp increase in claims when substantiation is nol required over time and across statutes, and concluding that "all available evidence supports the proposition thai much of the information covered by CBI claims is nol legitimately enlilled to protection as TSCA CBI").
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In 1990, for example, EPA reviewed CBI claims under the Toxic Substances Control Act and challenged nonmeritorious claims.^' By 1992, "industry had voluntarily amended and withdrawn over 600 claims alter EPA's inquiries." " CBI claims drop substantially (by as much as 50-60%) when EPA does require upfront substantiation of the nature of the trade secret protections, which it is legislatively required to do in other programs.''' The Hampshire Study also found thai eonfidential information was asserted for more than 90% of the premanufacture notices required for new toxic substances under TSCA.''^ In these TSCA notices, the firms almost always claimed as trade secret the chemical identity of the chemical, but they also asserted CBI protections on other pieces of information needed to assess the potential health risk of the product, including health and safety studies. ^ Unfortunately, however, the Hampshire Study docs not give percentages for the extent of CBI claims on health and safety research (as opposed to chemical identity); however, it notes throughout the report that there was a signillcant incidence of these elaims,'"' despite the fact that the agency's own general eounsel concedes that "health and safety stud[ies]" should never or rarely be proteeted from disclosure by trade secret elaims.'" Even industry representatives openly admit that they elaim CBI protection when the claim is inappropriate.'"T he General Accounting Office ("OAO") reports thai ihe Hampshire Study al.so found that firms claimed as CBI under TSCA intbrmaiion that had already been disseminated publicly, "hor example, information contained elsewhere in newspaper articles and corporate annual rcporls was submitted as CBI uas publicly available informalion from Ki'A's Toxics Release Invenlory, a system that contains nationwide information on toxic chemicals emitted into the air, ground, and water by manufacturing facilities." ToxiC StiBSI ANCl-s CoNIRoi. Ac I. xupni note 68, at 56. 91 See, e.g. Jn re HercuWs. Inc., No, TSCA-llI-416, 1990 WL 303887 (Apr. 26, 1990 . '^-TOXIC StiRSlANCt:s CONIROL AC r, supni note 70, at 5:2. LPA's limited resources make this approach available only in the short-term, however. Id. KI'A also reviewed CI3I claims on health and safety studies and found thai over one-tltth of the claims had no merit. Id.
'^ See. e.g.. HAMPSIIIRH STIJDY, supra note 61, at figs. 2, 6. Under TSCA, premanulacture notification CBI claims do not require upfront substantiation whereas section 8(e) adverse effects reports do require substantiation.
•^ See id. at 44-45 (referencing figures 1 and 2). 5 See id at 53-54 (referring to figures 9 and 10). See, e.g., id . at 12 (observing that ••|s[ubstantial numbers of CBI elaims were asserted for •toxicity, exposure, and environmental release data' except for the year 1986"); id. at 18-19 (recounting specific unjustified instances where industry asserted CBI claims on health and safety studies for reason.s that did not relate to trade-.secret concerns).
• V. 837, 874 (1980) (arguing that ISCA "specifically e\empt|s| health and safety studies from the protections otherwise atTorded to proprietary inlbrmation").
The Hampshire Study reaches strong conclusions with regard to the frequency of unjustified CBI elaims, noting that:
In those cases where EPA has had the resources to evaluate individual CBI claims, it has determined that a significant fraction of the submissions (up to 50 percent or more of Section 8(e) filings) contained invalid CBI elaims. When submitters of these claims were challenged, EPA prevailed /« eve-rv case.
HAMPSHIRE STUDY, supra note 61, at 41.^
In the GAO's 1994 study, industry commentators who were interviewed "aeeepted the [GAO's| basic finding that the cheniieal industry docs make improper confidentiality claims and needs to address such claims." Toxic StJlJSlANCl.s CONlRoi. Atl, .supra note 68, at 5;2. They defended their practice of overclaiming under TSCA, however, by arguing that "the purpose of TSCA information is to provide LPA with a factual basis for chemical regulation, not to provide a basis tor disseminating data on the chemicals to other interested organizations." Id.
From the standpoint of ensuring the quality of industry research used for regulation, broad CBI protections are very problematic. The only parties able to review the scientific information are a few "cleared" agency officials, and the rigor and assumptions made in their review are effectively unreviewable by others inside and outside the agency. As a result, a few agency ofllcials will decide whether the study's design and report passes muster, and these decisions themselves will be completely insulated from public view, leaving the agency officials with reduced incentives for making wise or aggressive decisions. The lack of oversight of research quality might also lead some manufacturers who are particularly inclined to conduct research of poor quality to take undue advantage of this reduced scientific oversight and accountability. As a result, the underlying quality of this large set of regulatory research may be compromised because it is insulated from searching review. In opposing the government's use of proprietary models to predict harm, industry has in fact conceded these serious problems that can attend classified information.
Yet it comes as no surprise that the EPA's concerted ellorts to reform the program have consistently failed given the multi-faceted advantages that accrue to firms from classifying information, and the lack of documentation of the adverse effects that generous CBI policies have on the quality and dissemination of scientific research.'"" Indeed, industry representatives not only vigorously oppose regulatory reform, but they argue that existing protections are inadequate to ensure that competitive secrets are safe from disclosure when information is submitted to regulators.'*"
The Viee President of Cropl.ite (the trade association o!' the iiii!ian\ pesticide manufacturers), for example, has observed: When puhlic at;t;L'ss Ui data and methods is not possible, such as when HPA must rely on proprietary models to perform risk assessments, the Agency must be able to establish, as a miilter of public record, that the "robustness checks" beini; applied are scientifically sound and that reprodiieibiliiy is being verilled through meaningful, independent validations, [Absent such a showing.| [tjhe Agency's decisions will continually be subject to challenge as "black box" exercises, unless adequate demonstration of the quality, utility, integrity, and objeetivity of the information produced by such proprietary models for use in regulation. EPA has also suggested tluit llrnis provide materials accounting to strengthen EPC'RA reporting, which would include intbrmation on toxic chemicals that enter, are used, and leave the facility. These reforms were similarly opposed and ultimately terminated by industry. See, e.g.. ENVIRONMI-NIAI, iNtORMATION. supra note 100, at II, 12 (discussing how industry opposition based on CBI grounds led to the abandonment of this proposal).
I"' Industry argues that even more trade-secret protections are needed given the "mosaic" effect-the ability of competitors to piece together infortnation about their operations from bits of The confidential business information protections afforded private research might be the largest source of reduced oversight and quality control over private, regulation-re levant research. But even if there were no CBI and all research were publicly available, under the current legislated and regulatory approaches, publiely sponsored research still receives much tnore vigorous scrutiny than private research. A number of tnandated quality controls apply only to federally funded research and exempt most private research, even when it is used in making decisions about public safety or environmental protection.'"* This skewed oversight is discussed, aticr Ilrst outlining the existing scientific scrutiny of private research used in regulation.
I. Scientific Review of Private Research Used in Regulation
Although private research is subject to considerably less public scrutiny than public research, there is some oversight of the quality of the research. For routine private studies submitted in support of an application to market a product or to obtain a permit to discharge pollution, the agency does review the information provided and, particularly in the case of pesticides, may review the original research and even the original data through the use of a working group.'"' When the research is not classified as CBI, other parties, including competitors and public interest groups, might also scrutinize the research if they have the time and interest, and ean file suit against the EPA if they believe that the grant of a license or registration is "arbitrary and capricious" because it is based on unreliable research.'""T he main means of controlling the quality of private research and protecting against biases in study design and reporting is through the specifleation of testing protocols.'"^ These protocols set forth cookbook-like requirements for conducting specific types of toxieity and related studies. Although rigid protocols cannot publicly available data. Sec. e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. at 80,396 (discussing how the regulated community "has made the argument that multiple pieees of data which may nut qualify individually to be treated as CBI and are made puhlicly a\ailable ean be pieced together to reveal a trade secret.'"); Letter from Warren Li, Stickle & Bill BaIek to EPA, .•mpni note 67, at 5 (same). In 199i<, the law Urm of Ropes and Gray prepared a report lor the Chemical Manufacturers Association thai advocated adoption of a uniform statute tbat would make it easier for its members to assert contldentiality claims based on the 'mosaic' argument. PKOI IcliON, supra note 57. Yet their support lor the "mosaic' effect problem was based on a Chemical Manufacturer Association commissioned study that hired someone to recreate one (not clearly random) industry based on the publiely available information. Id.
They also convened a working group to generally discuss the "mosaic effect," a discussion that is devoid of concrete examples or evidence. ,SVe id. at 97-98. Ihe extent and pervasiveness of the mosaic effect, then is weakly supported at best. Also unclear are the competitive harms that How from this intelligence gathering. Ihe volutninous report on the mosaic elTect does not provide a single example or argument about the potential types of harms resulting irom intelligenee-gatheringconsullant groups carefully piecing together publicly available information on competitor lirms. Id.
In its arguments, moreover, industry ignores the scientillc benefits of disclosure and assumes that the only social value to disclosure is the "public's right to know" the risks to v\hicb they are exposed. See id. at 107 (observing HPA's laek of CBI protection for some data cannot bcJustiHed by its ""right to know' mission"). See generuUy id. at § 5.
102 See infra Section in.B.2. I"-'' See. e.g., ATRA7tNr, supra notel3. 104 Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000) . "^5 See suprii note 12 and aecompanying lext. Cf. EPA's (iood Laboratory Praelices. 40 C.F.R. pt. 160 (providing general requirements for "good lab" practices tor research submitted to KPA; these requirements still leave researchers wiih eonsiderable research discretion in the design and reporting of most individual research projects).
protect against the suppression of adverse results or data falsification, they do provide itiiporlatit protections against bias iti the design of studies or in the reporting of results. Yet this protection is still incomplete. For cxutiiplc, if the protocols do not specify precise categories of adverse effects {or cndpoints) for animals exposed to toxins, then there is remaining discretion in what to count as an adverse effect or what unexpected effects to notice and report. These types of inevitabilities in most toxieity studies, except perhaps for the most routine, thus leave room for bias. Some of the tests ean also be altered or designed in ways that favor sponsor interests if the agency has not specilled restrictive protocols in advance. There has been no systematic inventory of the toxicity tests typieally used by sponsors or attempts to rank private research studies according to the remaining researcher discretion in design and reporting., so the extent of this problem remains unspecified. It is evident, however, that this discretion exists in some research and that it can lead to the underreporting of adverse effects.
Disproportionately Greater Oversight of Public Relative to Private Research
In contrast to the more limited scientific review applied to private research, a number of separate, overlapping checks are applied to ensure the quality of public research. The greater scrutiny applied to public as compared with private research is sutTiniarized in Table I below and discussed in more detail in the subsections that follow. 
a. Data Access Ac!
The Data Access Act, passed as an appropriations rider in 1999, requires that all "data needed to validate a federally funded study" be made available to requesting parties through the Freedom oflnformation Act.""' Regulatory firms ean obtain data from all federally funded studies and can review and reanalyze the data, oRen using eleetronie data supplied by the original researcher.'"' However, studies conducted by industry or others without the benefit of public funds are not covered by the legislation's data sharing requirements.""* As a result, the data underlying private research used in regulation need not be publicly available, even when access to this data is necessary for the public to comment meaningflilly on a regulation that relies on this private research. '"^ Indeed, the data might not even be available to the agency itself, unless an ofTlcial explicitly insists on the data as a condition to granting a license or permit.''"
The explicit exemption of private research from the Data Access Act not only leads to lopsided public oversight of regulation-relevant research, but seems directly at odds with the purported intent of the Aet. The rider's congressional sponsor, Richard Shelby, justified the Aet on the need for greater public access to regulatory science. As Shelby observes, "[pjublic confidence in the accuracy and reliability of information being used to drive public policy ultimately is in the best interest of scientific research. Increasing access to such data promotes the transparency and accountability that is essential to building public trust in government actions and decision-making."'''
b. Data Quality Act
A second law passed in 2001, also as a rider to an appropriations bill, the Data Quality Act, provides mechanisms for interested parties to file complaints about the quality of regulatory science, but again this Act focuses predominantly on publicly '0^ 5feShelbyAmendment, Pub. [-.No. 105-277, I 12 Stal. 2681-495 (!998) . "•^ See OMB Circular A-1 1 10. Uniform Administrative Requirements for Grants and Agreements with Inslitulions ot" Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Prolil Organizations, 64 l"ed. Reg. 54,926, 54.927 (Oct. 8, 1999) ("[l] n response to a Krcedom of information Acl (K)IA) request for data relating to published research findings produced under an award that were used hy the Federal Governmeni in developing policy or rules, the Federal awarding agency shall, within a rcasunablo time, obiain the reqiiL-sted data so that they can be made available to the public through the procedures established under the FOiA.'").
108 Sve OMH, Final Revision, OMB Circular A-l 10, 64 Fed. Reg. at 54.929 (requiring research findings to be produced if they were "produeed under an award that [was| used by the Federal Government in developing an ageney aelion that has the loree and elleet of law'"). (2002) (the ehair of the National Aeademy of Seienee committee, Richard Merrill, expressed coneern over ihe faet that Ihe Shelby Amendment "is not bilateral in its applieation" sinee it does nol apply "to data that [is| generaled by private dollars that [is] submitted to support agency decisions."); id. al 16 (reporting that panelist David Hawkins, representative of a public inlerest advocacy group, criticized the Shelby Amendmcni for being '"one-sided" because it applies only lo federally funded research" and not to "industry-supported studies that have been submitted on a confidential basis""), II** Bui see CKNTER FOR REGULATORY EFKEC riVkNl-:SS, R[;i_AnoNSHIPS Wirn PRlVAIh FiJNDiNti SoiiRCiiS, at http://www'.theere.eom/aceess/comments/2-9-7.htnil (last visited July 20, 2003) ("As part of the award process, federal awardees should be required to provide notice lo private research partners that sharing data with federally funded researches may subject that data to possible public diselosurc."').
I " Richard Shelby, Acvoiinlahilily and Tninspuri-ncy: Public Access lo Federally Fuiuk'il Research Data. 37 HARV. J. LLGIS. 369, 379 (2000) . funded researeh. The Data Quality Act requires agencies to develop formal procedures "for ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by Federal ageneies" through a formal complaint process."' The implementing regulations, however, exempt most industry-sponsored science from these new processes. Speeifieally, the Data Quality Act requirements apply only to science that is ''disseminated" by an agency, but exempts "adjudications," which has been interpreted to include studies produeed by a company to support an application for licensing a product or obtaining a pollution permit.""* OMB has also interpreted the term "dissemination" to exempt "public filings," which would seem to include industries" documentation of eonipliance, as well as the basis for their Toxic Release Inventory estimates submitted under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA")."" Finally, OMH exempts from the Data Quality Aet all information classified as confidential business information.'"" Together these Data Quality Aet exemptions insulate from the "sound seienee" requirements virtually all mandated industry research. Subsequent "'data quality" regulations passed by the agencies themselves leave OMB s broad exemptions of private research in place. Most striking is EPA's recent promulgation of guidelines intended specifically for the oversight of "third-party" research submitted to the Mar. 22, 2002) [hereinafter NAS DATA QUAMIY IRANSCRII>I DAY 2] (expressing concern that the ageney "reaeh[es| into the open literature for information that it will use in making a peslieide decision and that though that literature may be peer reviewed, ... we believe |it{ eomplies with a much lower quality of standards in terms of transparency and reproducibiiity to trump the data produeed under higher quality standards hy nianutaelurers in making a pesticide decision").
"-'' See Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objeetivity, Utility, and Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies. 67 Fed. Reg. 369, 377-78 (Jan. 3, 2003) Idetlning "dissemination" as "agency initiated or sponsored distribution of information to the publie . . . |but| does not include distribution limited to correspondenee with individuals or persons, . . . publie tilings, ... or aitjudieative processes'").
'I' ' See 67 Fed, Reg. 369, 374 (listing requirements that data and methods be made publicly available does not "override other compelling interests siieh as privacy, trade secrets, inlelleetual property, and other contldentialit> protections"); see also NAS, DAIA QUAI.IIY 'I RANSCRll'l, DAY 2, supra note I 14, at 128-29 (noting Dr. Galson"s statement that FDA approvals are largely based on industry generated data and that "much of this is eonsidered eonlldential business information. It is closely held by the sponsiirs.""). Bui see McGarity & Shapiro, supnt note 97, at 887 (arguing that trade secret status should not extend to much of the health and safety testing information); see also Lyndon, supra note 67, at 22-35 (outlining the prominenee of trade secrecy claims under major regulatory statutes and observing that because "Ifjor a worker or neighbor seeking data from a company, trade secret information is, as a practical matter, simply unavailable"" the employer lacks any incentive to disclose such information) (citations omitted).
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agency."^ Despite its title, these guideiltics appear to keep the OMB exemptiotis of private research in place,"*' targeting instead state-produced research.
c. Scientific Misconduct
Aggressive provisions that penalize researchers who engage in scientific misconduct arc targeted solely at federally funded research and do not apply to private research. To ensure that scientific research is conducted honestly, federal law provides the Oflice of Research Integrity with the authority to investigate federally funded researchers who arc alleged lo have engaged in "scientific misconduct," a term that includes fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism of data.' ' ** Any party can complain of this scieniillc tiiisconduct, and there are anecdotes of industry using the misconduct provisions to harass and discredit scientists whose research is adverse to tbeir interests.'"'" Again the disparate oversight of the quality of public versus private research repeats itself Publicly sponsored research is governed by scientific tnisconduct regulations that withdraw funding and stigmatize the oflending researchers; private research is exempt frotn this form of regulatory oversight, even when private research forms the pritiiary basis for federal liealtli and safety regulation.
d. Heightened Peer Review Requirements for Agency Researeh
In contrast to its ad hoc review of private research, which varies by supervising staff official and the applicable regulatory program, EPA is employing increasingly rigorous and systematic peer review of research that is produced or funded by the EPA and the federal government.'"' Federally conducted research was criticized in "^ tint see HPA Human Testing; Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 68 Ted. Reg. 24.410, 24,413 (May 7, 2003 ) ("In general. I:PA uiinnol readily determine whellier sut;h policies are consisterl wilh or as prolcctive oi' human subjecis as the Common Rule, nor the extent to which such policies or standards have been followed in the eonduei of any p;irtieular study. Thus, even wellconducted third-party human studies may raise difHeult questions for the Agoney when it seeks to determine their aeceplabiiity tor eonsideration."). PROHS. 159, 160 (1996) . '•" Some statutes like FIFRA even mandate rigorous peer review and seientitlc oversight for federal (but not private) research. See., e.g., 7 U.S.C. § § I36w(d)-(e) (2000) (requiring the scientific advisory panel established under the FIFRA to review the seientitlc basis for major regulatory proposals concerning pesticides and to adopt peer review procedures for scientific studies earried out by the government or under federal contract pursuant to KIFRA). Some of this elaborate peer review is mandated by Congress, and some is internally mandated. See NAlloNAl. ACADF.MIKS PRl.ss, SlRtNGIIIl:NING SflENCl-: AT TMl-U.S. HNVIRONMI.N I Al. PROI hXTlON A(.ii:NCY: RF.SCARCII MANAUKMliNI AND PtER RhVlhW PRACMCES 102 (2000) , available at bttp://books.nap.edu/books/ 0309071275/html#pagetop (listing the statutes that require peer review of "various scientific atid the past for Ihe lack of reliable and standardized peer review.'"' In response to these criticisms, KPA has established an agency-wide peer review prcKess that subjects a great deal ot" agency research, especially "signiticant work products," to external peer review.'" Here again the emphasis is exclusively on agency "work products" for peer review.''"^ While some private studies might be included in this peer review when that research is included within a larger agency risk assessment, it is not clear how rigorously the individual private studies will be reviewed at this later stage of review.'"ĉ .
Limited Ch'ersight of Research Ethics for Private Research
Since we are concerned only with research quality, the ethical conduct of the research is secondary and not directly relevant. Nevertheless, it deserves mention that institutions receiving federal dollars must institute aggressive oversight processes to ensure human subject proteetion in research that uses human subjects.'"'' These human subject protections can limit the types of research that can be done.'" Again, however, human subject protections do not apply to privately sponsored research done outside of these institutions, even though an international treaty generally prohibits unethiea! research on human subjects.'""* The agencies have routinely applied this ethical requirement to private research so Ihat both public and private research is conducted in ways that protect human subjects, although Congress has never legislated the requirement.'"' Private manufacturers have recently filed a petition challenging this equal treatment of private and public research, arguing that l^PA is legally required to consider human subjects research regardless of whether it complies with federal requirements governing human subjects research."" The outcome of the petition is still pending.'" The ways that conflicts of interest and suppression of adverse information have historically afflicted private research used in regulation, especially in relation to its public research counterpart, were discussed in Part II. In this section, we discuss the incomplete ways that the regulatory system has come to terms with these two problems inherent in sponsor-controlled research.
1. Agencies Do Not Require Private Research to be Independent trom the Sponsor or to Provide Conflict Disclosures Despite growing insistence by biomedica! journal editors that the scientific research they publish is "free of commercial influence,"'^" agencies continue to accept all private research without any disclosure of research independence. Most federal agencies, including the HPA. the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Mine Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer Produet Safety Commission, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, have no formal mechanisms to identify potential conflicts of interest and promote research integrity.'^'
The EPA, for example, does not require any eontlict disclosures for research submitted in support of a license to market a pesticide or toxic substance or in support of a license to emit pollutants or handle hazardous wastes.'^"' The Hood and Drug Administration ("'FDA") is one of the few agencies that has instituted a eonflict policy that requires financial disclosures for safety research conducted by private parties in support of a license to market a drug or food additive.'^' The required FDA disclosures do not., however, discriminate between sponsored researeh where the sponsor controls the design or reporting ol' the research and research where the sponsor relinquishes eontrol over the research process.'^'' Thus, an important mechanism for encouraging greater freedom among researchers is lost.
Penalizing Suppression of Researeh
Several of the major environmental laws anticipate the possibility that regulated actors will conceal adverse information and research results, and to counteract this tendency, the laws require the disclosure of adverse information under threat of both civil and eriminai sanctions.'" Two statutes play a particularly significant role in LAWYLR 681, 681, 739-41 (1995) (discussing dictating the applicable requirements governing the disclosure of information on adverse effects (as opposed to environmental releases): the Toxic Substances Control Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.''" Yet. despite Congress's hope that ageneies could deter the suppression of research through strong sanctions and aggressive enforcement, these provisions appear only partly effective.
Compliance with these adverse eOeets reporting requirements is generally a funetion of two features of the regulatory program. First, the requirements must be clear enough to be enforceable. Second, the sanetions and resourees dedicated to enforcement must present a credible risk of enforcement to the manufacturer and other covered parties.
With respect to the first criterion, TSCA and FIFRA differ considerably with regard to the elarity and enforceability of their requirements. Under FIFRA, EPA's regulations governing "adverse elTects" reporting are lengthy, specific, and leave little discretion or room for argumentation with regard to reporting requirements. For example, "opinion" evidence by reliable experts;'""' discontinued studies;'"" and a lengthy list of effects, including minor eflects. are identified as reportable.'^' HPA further warns that while registrants might doubt the validity or significance of an adverse effect, they must still report it and can simply provide their own qualifications, disagreements, or other commentary in the report.'"" By contrast, EPA has still not promulgated regulations interpreting the similar "substantial risk" reporting requirement of TSCA. Instead EPA has published only "policy statements" that appear to be getting progressively weaker in terms of the speeiflcity they provide regarding eompliance.'"'"' EPA in fact goes to great lengths to remind regulated parties that since the guidelines are not rules, they are not officially binding.'^^ Even as guidance, EPA's direetions are generally unhelpful. In stark contrast to the several-page list of speeifie adverse effects that must be civil and eriminai penalties for violating reporting requirements, including criiiiinal enforcement of false reporting and fraud).
13« See FIFRA, 7 U,S-C. ij 136dU)(2) (2000) ("If at any time after the re-registration of a pesticide ihe registrant has additional factual information regarding unreasonable adverse effects on the environment of the pesticide, the registrant shall submit such information to the regulator."); TSCA. 15 U.S.C, SS 2607(e), (e) (2000) (staling thai manufaeiurers and processors must maintain records of "significant adverse reactions lo health or the environmcnl , . , alleged to have been caused by the substance or mixture , , , |and must immediately report| informalion which reasonably supports the eonehision that such substances or mixture presents a substantial risk of injury to health or the environment").
1-^' ' Setf generally 40 CK.R, pt 159 (2003) (outlining reporting requirements for risk/benefit information): KPA, Reporting Requirements For Risk/Benefit Information, 62 Fed. Reg. 49,370 (Sept, 19, 1997) , lf(4, ' •^^ Sea, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. at 49.372 ("Registrants are free to submit information challenging the validity of section 6(a)(2) information either at the time of, or al\er submission of the informalion to the Ageney."),
' "W For example, in its 2003 guidanee, liPA ereatcd a number of new exemptions and lengthened the reporting time from fifteen working days to thirty calendar days. See TSCA Section 8(e); Notification ol" Substantial Risk; Policy Clarifieaiion and Reporting Guidance. 68 l-ed, Reg, 33,129,33,130 (June3,2003) . '•'-See. e.g., id . ("Although these preferences could be codified in procedural rules .... HPA is not at this time adopting them as rules. While submitters of section 8(e) notices are not therefore obligated to comply with the preferenees artieulated in this document. KI'A encourages submitters to consider and follow them . , . ,").
reported under FIFRA, EPA's TSCA guidance provides a very vague and generally narrow set of "risks" that necessitate reporting.'''*' A "substantial risk," for example, occurs when evidence "reasonably supports the conclusion that the chemical substance or mixture can produce cancer, mutation, birth defects, or toxic elTects resulting in death, or serious or prolonged incapacitation."'^^ This means that only the most serious incidents are identified as within the scope of TSCA.'^'^ Also in contrast to the FIFRA reporting requirements, EPA does not advise manufacturers and other covered parties to err on the side of reporting, but provides manufacturers with discretion to decide when evidence "reasonably supports" a conclusion of "substantial risk"-opinion evidence is not required to be reported.'^' Finally, a series of confusing exemptions for reports made to other federal offices further buffer manufacturers from the threat of enforcement given the extra steps enforcement officials must take to learn of violations.'^" As a result, manufacturers have many plausible arguments for not disclosing adverse information in a timely or infortnative way under TSCA.
Second, to identify and penalize the suppression of adverse information, the agency must learn abc^ut it; yet the enforcement resources EPA dedicates to the statutes that require adverse reporting of research results-FIFRA and TSCA-arc the lowest in comparison to other statutory programs.'^' Moreover, the testing and information disclosure requirements of TSCA and FIFRA programs arc not delegated to the states, and thus EPA remains the sole agency overseeing enforcement of these programs.'^'
This makes the probability of catching noncompliancc with adverse reporting requirements lower still, despite HPA's undocumented assurances that since 1977 it has "initiated a number of formal enforcement actions relating to Section 8(e) of TSCA," most of which concern "the 1-1' ' .SVf, f jj,, /(/. al 33,138 (stating what the t'.PA considers "substantial risks"). 147 W. '48 "Substantial risks" to ecosjstems, for example, occur in relatively rare and worrisome settings. Ihe HPA, for example, identities substantial risks in non-emergency .situations where there are "[ejcologically significant changes in species' interrelationships; that is, changes in population behavior, growth, survival, etc. that in [urn affect other species' behavior, growth, or survival." IJ. at 33, 138. 14^ At most, EPA warns on its section 8(e) fact sheet that "|l|imited sludics (e.g., range finding studies), preliminary resuils and draft reporls muy constitute suTficient evidence for Section f<(e) reporting." EPA, TSCA Si'CllON SfK) FACT SHI:I-|, at hltp://ww\v.cpa.gov,'opptintr/tsea8e/doc/ faetsSe.htm (last updated Apr. 12, 2004) (emphasis added). KPA also warns that the manufacturer need not wait lor corroborating evidence, but implies that not reporting if a manufacturer believes the information is low quality is a valid basis for withholding reports. ISCA Section H(e(; Notification of Substantial Risk; l'olic\ Clarification and Reporting Guidance, 68 I ed. Reg. at 33.138-3''.
I?*" /(/. at 33.139-4(1. '5' Information on KPA's enforcement resources under I II'RA was not readily available; in terms of the number of inspections conducted by f PA regional ofllces, this statute fared ihe worst, accounting for only one percent of all inspections conducted in 1998 (a decline from roughly 3% in late reporting of animal study findings."'^' In addition, the penalties for violating adverse etiects reporting requirements arc generally the same under both KIKRA and TSCA-^roughly a $5,000 to $15,000 penalty tor each unreported incident with the "possibility" of criminal penalties if the knowledge of the information was reckless,'^^ although tor KIFRA, the penalties also include a risk that EPA might cancel the pesticide.'" In comparing the costs of the penalties (and Ihe low probability of being caught in violation of the regulations) against the economic benefits of withholding adverse information, rational companies may tlnd it in their interest to violate the adverse reporting requirements when the chance of detection is especially low.'^'' By contrast, since greater regulatory activity is a reasonable worry as a result of adverse effects reporting, not to mention potential tort liability, manufacturers, and related parties might perceive great bienefits from resisting reporting.
As a resuft, there is reason for skepticism about the effectiveness of the adverse reporting requirements, especially under TSCA, given the strong incentives that regulated parties have for suppressing this information. Armed with ambiguous and narrow criteria for reporting under TSCA, coupled with low sanctions and a low probability of entbrccmcnt, one would expect rational manufacturers and other covered parties to report adverse discoveries only when the records of these adverse etVects arc likely to be discovered. In fact, the primary information that is reported as "substantial risk" information under TSCA is standard toxicity studies.'^"
Incidents" and other unexpected adverse effects are rarely, if ever, reported.'^" This is rational to the extent that planned., in-house research would be mueh more easily discovered after the fact by EPA. Second, tlrms historically did not report any "substantial risks" under TSCA until EPA threatened more aggressive enforcement aetion and simultaneously ottered reduced penalties ibr the submission of AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MKDICINE VOL. 30 NO. 2&3 2004 information.'^'' In response, the companies volunteered 11,000 studies of their products-four times the number of studies submitted in the prior firtccn years since passage of the statute!""" Finally, it appears that industry has developed a compliance strategy under TSCA that routinely involves sending toxicity research to the F,PA even when the outcome is inconclusive or not suggestive of a "substantial risk." Tbese are called "for your information" ("FYi") submissions. "*' This might also be a rational compliance strategy for industry because tbey can avoid damaging admissions of "substantial risk" by labeling all reports as FYI.
Equally relevant to the instant analysis, it is not clear how useable the information that is reported under these adverse reporting requirements is, or whether it is even intended to be useable when the manufacturer or other party reports it. The data reported under bt^th FIFRA and TSCA is not available except at EPA offices, although an Internet list is available for TSCA "substantial risk" reports arranged by date of the report (but not searchable with other queries). ""• The data is sometimes protected as confidential business information, although EPA does require upfront substantiation for the "substantial risk" reporting under TSCA."'Ê ven though the rates of CBI elaims are far lower for 8(e) submissions, presumably because of this substantiation requirement,'*"* CBI elaims still lead to the classification of either the ehemical identity or the submitter for about 20-25% of the "adverse effects" reports. Even when the adverse etTeets reports are accessible and publicly available, they appear to be incomplete. In a 1994 report, a nonprofit examined more than 13,000 section 8(e) submissions and concluded, among other weaknesses, that "[sjome notices did not provide enough information about tbe nature of the risk, or the researeh method used, to assess the significance of tbe results."'^l^* 
IV. REFORM
The insulation and limited scrutiny of private research used in regulation, especially in contrast to the scrutiny aflbrded public research, is problematic from the standpoint of "sound science" and sound regulation. It is impossible to empirically determine the costs of the current, weak quality controls governing private research, because so much of this research is classified or otherwise exempted from meaningllil oversight. Yet as discussed in Part II, one can expect the quality of private research to be potentially biased in ways that under-state risks. Additionally, the absence of incentives to conduct independent research (in contrast to the obvious benetlts of retaining sponsor control over the design and reporting of research) raise still more reason to worry that much of private research submitted to regulators may not in fact be free of conflicts, or at least is not as unbiased as is possible under the circumstances.
In this tlnal Part, we offer three sets of reforms to correct the quality problems that may plague private research used for regulation, especially in relation to public research. We start with what we consider to be the most obvious and easy to implement reforms and move incrementally to more vigorous reforms."'' 66 Figure 1 was prepared using HPA's section 8(e) database. See 01/02/03 TO 01/15/03 FYI SUBMISSIONS, supra note 162, For each submission that included at least one CBI claim, the chemical that was the basis for tbe submission is identified as a CHI chetnical. The larger column provides the total number of non-redundant 8(e) submissions for each year (note that two of the years are incomplete). For access to the underlying worksheets used to prepare this figure, please contact Wendy Wagner at WWagnerfii'mail.law.utexas.edu.
'^^ These reform proposals are also advanced in Wagner, supra note 16. to comba! the overlapping problem of inadequate cnvironnienial and public health research that results, in pan, from regulaled parties' superior intbrmation over the ctlccts of their products and activities. A regulatory system that provides considerably greater scrutiny for publicly funded research than private research cannot be justified. Since regulatory decisions have a direct impact on the public health and environmental protection, research that is demonstrably afflicted with bias should be afforded at least the same level of scrutiny as research that is more disinterested.
To that end, we recommend that whatever oversight is given to public researeh (and the appropriate level is certainly open to question) should also be applied to private research. The Data Access Act, the Data Quality Act, internal peer review requirements, scientific misconduct, and even human subject protections should apply with the same ibrce to private research as they apply to public research. To the extent that research is protected as confidential business information, the agency should develop oversight mechanisms to oflset the lack of oversight by outside parties. Pormai peer review requirements and random validation of research, with hefty fines for research that is incompletely reported or not accurate, are among the possible approaches to ensure equivalent oversight of the quality of confidential research."''* In order to deter parties from overclaiming CBI for health and safety research, moreover, the expense of additional peer review and random validation should be borne by the parties claiming CBI protections."''' If research is ultimately tbund to be biased or incomplete, the manufacturer-sponsor would be "red-tlagged" and all of their studies would require validation until the agency is satisfied that they are once again conducting quality, independent research.
B. CORRECTING BIAS AND SUPPRESSION IN PRIVATE RESEARCII
Private research runs the risk of being biased by financial conflicts of interest. Private research that is adverse is also capable of being suppressed. Reforms should be implemented to directly address these two problems.
I. Discourage Conflicted Research
Under the current system, researeh with complete sponsor control enjoys potentially the same credibility as research produced by scientists with no financial interest in the outcome and no sponsor control. HPA does not require confiict disclosures for private information submitted for regulatory purposes and makes no apparent distinction between private research produced by academics under contracts that grant them complete independence and research funded and controlled by a regulated party.'^" '™ As discussed, moreover, a signillcant portion oC industry-sponsored research used in these regulatory efforts is protected from external scientifie review through trade secrel and eonfiiJcntial business privileges. See supra Part III.A. In faet. even in spile of ils promise of requiring agencies to use and publicize only "quality," "objective" seienee, the Data Quality Aet requirements omit atiy diselosure requiremenis for conflicts of interest. By ignoring these disclosure requirements, the Dala Quality Aet seems to provide the publie with niisleadingly incomplete information for evaluating the integrity of researeh used for regulatory decisions. See Consolidated Appropriations (Information (or [)ata) Quality) Act, § 515. Pub, t.. No. 106-554, 1 14 Stat. 2763 |2OI)l)i.
As discussed earlier. EPA's willingness to treat "all science as equal" has been flatly rejected by the scientific community.'^' The hiomcdical coinmunity's concern about potential conllicts ol interest has been codified in the widespread,' ' although not uniformly applied,'''' policy of Journals to require that the authors of submitted articles disclose any financial relationships and sources of influence so that editors and readers can Judge whether the results reported are influenced by those financial ties.''''' The academic community has endorsed this eommitment to independent research, as have several policy nonprofits.' ^ It is worth noting, moreover, that the scicntillc community relies heavily on researehers' disclosure of conflicts of interest despite the fact that, as part of the peer review process, scientific editors and peer reviewers are far better situated to identify biased research than regulators, the public, or political officials.
FLPA'S laissez faire approach to research could be reformed simply by adopting conflict disclosures similar to those used by the biomedical Journals."'' Under such a reform, researchers and scientists providing critiques, comments, and research submitted to or used by an agency would be required to sign a conflict form '^'* The Ibrm orconnict disclosures used by biomcdical journals has grtiun mort-sophisiieaied over the years, and the editors ol a group of ihc world's leading biomedie;il journals reccniK iJcclared thai ihey will no longer publish arlicle.s based on sludies done under coniracls in uhiuh ihe investigators did not have the unl'etlercd right to publish the findings. In a joint statement the editors of thirteen journals asserted that eontraetual arrangements thai allow spiinsor-uoiUroI ol' piibiication "noi only erode the fabric of intellectual inquiry that has fostered so much high-ciuality elinicalspecifying the extent of financial and sponsor influence on the research.'^R esearchers, for example, would be required to disclose financial and other conflicts of interest that might bias their work, and they would also be required to disclose whether they had the contractual right to publish their findings without influence and without obtaining consent of the sponsor. If their work was reviewed by a party affected by the regulation prior to publication or submission, that review would need to be disclosed as well. Sponsors would also be required to provide this disclosure for all information they submit to the agency.
By mandating disclosures, sponsors who do relinquish control over the design and reporting of their sponsored research will be rewarded for their restraint and openness.'^'' Requiring disclosure of the extent of sponsor influence on a project thus ensures that sponsors who fund research will not be tarred with the same brush as sponsors who work closely with researchers to control the design, methods, and reporting of the results. Rewards for disinterested research, in turn, should generate incentives for doing more of it. In addition, requiring mandatory conflict of interest disclosures will benefit the ptiblie. poliey-makers, and the media by making it easier for them to assess the objectivity of individual research projects, especially when a "scientific controversy" arises.'^' Requiring standardized disclosures even assists journal editors and fellow scientists in evaluating studies when they serve on scientific advisory boards or are otherwise involved in reviewing regulatory science.
Discourage Suppression of Research
To limit the opportunities for actors to conceal adverse information through nondisclosure contracts. EPA should clarify and strengthen its adverse reporting requirements to leave fewer ambiguities regarding the compliance requirements, at least for the TSCA reporting requirements.
By providing more specific requirements for reporting under these provisions, EPA could minimize opportunities for actors to dodge or delay adverse information reporting.""' The information that is reported, moreover, could be posted on the Internet and could be searched using a variety of queries, including chemical name and manufacturer. EPA might also select the most salient and important "adverse effects" information to counteract firms' natural inclination to dilute damaging information with routine "data dumps" of all in-house toxicity studies. Finally, HPA should institute a focused enforcement campaign to increase the probability that noncompliant firms will be caught. Since the information most likely to be suppressed will be less susceptible to documentation, EPA could otfer bounties and added whistleblower protections for the disclosure of this reportable information, as well as educating informants of the types of information that should legally be disclosed.
Congress could also amend the reporting requirements to make them more eifective. Most of the changes would include broadening the category of persons responsible for reporting and increasing the sanctions for violation of the reporting requirements. Initially, EPA attempted to include pesticide manufacturers' agents, including research scientists, among the groups responsible for reporting under FIFRA.'"' EPA concluded ultimately that it lacked legislative authority to broaden the category of responsible parties,"^"" but Congress could amend the law to explicitly include these agents.'**^ Scientists and others, who are often contractually barred from reporting adverse effects, will then have an overriding legal obligation to report adverse effects or else risk civil and criminal personal sanctions. Congress could also impose more significant civil and criminal penalties for the failure of a firm or any person to report adverse information, perhaps by including explicit causes of action for any victims that suffered from the suppression of information. Increasing the sanctions will increase the incentives for compliance. Finally, EPA must be provided with greater resources to oversee and enforce against the suppression of research. These lapses are difficult to catch, but with greater fmancial resources and stronger regulatory reporting requirements, EPA officials will be able to identify more violations or at least present a credible threat to counteract some of the incentives for noncompliance.
C. RI-:K)RMING CoNriDi-:NTiAL BUSINLSS INKORMATION
Although its reform is controverted, the existence of a problem with current CBI protections is beyond question. EPA, the General Accounting Office ("GAO"), and any non-de-minimis releases. Legal authorily exists for [iPA lo make ihis change because Congress clearly delegates the decision about setting reportable quantities or threshold levels to the KPA, Sec Clean" Water Act, 33 IJ.S.C. § 132l(bH4) 12000); CKRCLA, 42 U.S.C. ij 9602(b) (2000), '8' See F.PA Reporting Roquircnients for Risk/Bcnetlt Information, 62 Fed. Reg. 49,,')88 (Sept. 19, 1997) (originally dellning "registrant" to include "any employee or agent of such a person; provided that any employee or agent who is not expected to perform any activities related to the development, testing, sale or registration of a pestieide, and who could not reasonably be expected to come inio possession of information that is otherwise reportable under this part, shall not be eonsidered a registrant tor purposes ol this part; and provided further that informalion possessed by an agent shall only be considered to be possessed by a registrant if the agent acquired such information while acting for the registrant").
"*-See Reporting Requirement for Risk/Uenellt Inlbrmalion; Amendment and Correction, 62 fed. Reg. 49,388 (Sept. 19, 1997) (codified at 40 C.I-.R. pt. 159) (omitting "agents" from detmilion of registrants).
18.1 TSCA appears to already have broadened the scope of responsible parties for reporting. Under TSCA, "any person who bas possession of a study" is among those required lo report relevant health and safety studies on a toxie substanee to the EPA. 15 U.S.C. (} 2607(d) (2000) . A clearer definition of what constitutes a "study" and the reporting requirements could impose substantially greater demands on both researchers and sponsors. manufacturers under FIFRA).'"'' Congress could also lengthen Ihc time for reimbursement for data compensation under FIFRA. ''"' In cases where the beneficiaries of the safety information arc dilfuse, public fiinds would provide the reimbursement. Prior to implementing such a reform, it would be advisable to conduct a follow-up to the GAO's 1999 study to better isolate areas where competitive harm is most likely and develop approaches that directly address those potential harms.'*" It is also important to explore the extent to which trade secret protections lor chemical identity impair the use of health and safety research on that chemical by scientists and public health officials, a subject not addressed in any of the confidential business reports published to date.
A second, and more cumbersome, approach proposed by the HPA is to require firms to provide up-front substantiation for their CBI claims.'**" Although firms object to up-lTont substantiation as unduly burdensome, the requirement is used in some statutory programs such as EPCRA and has resulted in substantially fewer CB! claims.'"' Finally, EPA could institute regulatory processes that provide oversight of the quality of manufacturer research, like random replication of the studies, and eharge the costs through to all manufacturers as an administrative cost of claiming trade secret proteetion. Hach CBI claim eould be charged a review and classification fee Ihat rellects the higher costs associated with securing the information and reviewing the elaim.'''^ EPA could also levy penalties for CBI claims found to be unjustified based either on an internal agency review or a review conducted following a FOIA request.' " Such sanctions seem reasonable, especially in light of the significant penalties that can be levied against EPA officials who release trade secret-protected information without Justification.''**' CBI claims could be tallied, much like EPA's Toxics Release Inventory Program data, to reveal the number and nature of CBI claims each industry files.'"*' This may produce some accountability for the claims, and lead insurers, investors, and the public at large to decide how to evaluate specific industries in light of the .secrecy related to the health risks that might be presented by their activities. D, FiNAi. OBSFRVATIONS Ultimately, it might be preferable for all research to be done under the supervision of the EPA or state governments, with the costs charged back to the manufacturers.'"'*' Research required for regulation might be more expensive when done by the agency, but it will provide less risk of conflicts and a greater assurance of both consistency and reliability. Whether such a dramatic move is appropriate will depend on the extent of problems with private research and the cost increases that would result from EPA overseeing or conducting the research through its own facilities and contractors. To be effective, however, the research would need to be done in a "double-blind" fashion so that the manufacturer or regulated party has no way to trace the researcher or visa versa. Such a public research initiative would still require some protections for CBI and data compensation.
V. CONCLUSION
Private researeh produced by regulated parties under the pressure of future regulation is at significantly greater risk of underreporting harm.s than corresponding publiely sponsored research. Use of this compromised research for regulation could lead to protections that are not adequate to protect health and the environment. Yet despite these inherent problems with some sponsored science, current regulatory approaches continue to treat private research gingerly, often immunizing it tVom any external scrutiny at the behest of the regulated party. Even publiely accessible private research is not subjected to the quality control that applies to public research. In this Article, we argue that the playing field for these two types of regulatory research should be leveled. Private research should be subject to at least the same controls as public research. At the same time, other deficiencies specific to private research, such as sponsor-induced bias and suppression of adverse results, should be counteracted through more rigorous regulatory oversight, 1% 42 U.S.C. i; 1 IO42(c) (2000) (prescribing regulations "equivalent to comparable provisions in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Hazard Communication Standard"}. l**^ See aho HAMPSHlRl-STUDY, supra note 61, at 39 (recommending report cards ""indicating for each submitter the number of submissions, the number of CBI claims, and perhaps the number of challenges issued on these claims"). l **^ An alternative approach would be ihc certification of private laboratories, with periodic quality audits, to ensure greater research independence from manufacturer and researcher, i'f. Shapiro & Charrow, supra note 18, at 2510 (suggesting similar certification requirements to reduce conflicts occurring in FDA required biomedical re.sfareb(.
